๐ TI-2026-020D โ "The Seychelles Veil" โ Chinese Clouds, Hong Kong Intermediaries, and Indian-Ocean Shell Registration
๐ Executive Summary
A recurring routing-and-registration pattern: mainland/PRC-adjacent cloud operators, Hong Kong intermediaries, Singapore points of presence, and Seychelles registration artifacts appear together across AS132203 (Tencent), AS150436 (BytePlus/ByteDance), AS135377 (Zenlayer), AS138152/142403 (Yisu Cloud), AS142002 (Scloud), AS202412 (Omegatech) and AS211484 (YSZ Trading).
The strongest evidence is technical: 410+ IPs show multi-country geo-disagreement, shared scanner HASSH families recur across corporate boundaries, and several networks expose Seychelles-linked contacts โ tech@cloudinnovation.org, tel:+248-4-610-795, abuse@omegatech.sc, cymru_country=SC.
Cloud Innovation Support (the +248 Seychelles contact) is the registration end of the chain; Yisu Cloud and YSZ Trading show the clearest HKโSC reseller-shell pattern; Omegatech LTD reads as criminal-hosting rather than ordinary geo-noise. BytePlus/ByteDance (TikTok's cloud arm) infrastructure is present in the SSH abuse set.
Seychelles is useful precisely because it places a corporate/legal layer far from the operators' commercial and routing centres โ jurisdictional and reputational arbitrage, not mere geolocation error.
๐ One telephone number in the Indian Ocean, holding four 'independent' companies together
Pull the contact records for a Hong Kong cloud called Yisu, a Singapore cloud called Scloud, and you find something a coincidence cannot explain: the same support identity, Cloud Innovation Support, the same address tech@cloudinnovation.org, and the same telephone number in the Seychelles — +248-4-610-795 — stitched across AS135377, AS138152, AS142002 and AS142403. Four autonomous systems that present to the world as separate, unrelated, differently-flagged businesses are reachable through a single phone in an archipelago of 100,000 people off the coast of East Africa. That number is the connective tissue of the entire cluster. It is the thread that, pulled, unravels the costume.
Seychelles is not in this story for its beaches. It is here because an International Business Company there discloses no beneficial owner, charges 0% tax, and offers nominee directors as a standard product. It is the legal equivalent of a blank face. So when Chinese-operated capacity routes through Hong Kong intermediaries and Singapore points of presence but registers in the Seychelles, the registration is not where the business is — it is where the business cannot be followed.
๐ฐ๏ธ The famous, the faceless, and the one that is simply a crime scene
The cluster spans the entire respectability spectrum, which is precisely why it is instructive. At the top sit names you know: Tencent, and BytePlus — the enterprise cloud arm of ByteDance, the company that owns TikTok. Their addresses appear in the attack set not because Shenzhen ordered an SSH brute-force, but because hyperscale clouds rent compute to anyone with a card, and abuse control lags abuse. We hold this firmly: presence is high-confidence; corporate intent is not. A honeypot caught a credential like claude:claude being tried from this space — the attackers are guessing at the names of the very era we live in.
At the bottom sits Omegatech (AS202412), and there the hedging stops. Independent research by Breakglass describes this single Seychelles-flagged /24 as hosting 67 command-and-control servers across 16 malware families; abuse.ch's ThreatFox tracks it; Spamhaus drops the whole AS. Inside our own honeypot it produced 753 successful logins and actually ran system-discovery commands — the behaviour of an operator, not a stray VM. Between Tencent's plausible deniability and Omegatech's naked criminality lie the shells — Yisu, YSZ (whose registrant leaked the ordinary Gmail address zengshiyu1992@gmail.com), Scloud — the reseller layer where a mainland operation buys a Hong Kong face and a Seychelles silence.
๐๏ธ The Official Scaffolding โ Institutional Anchors
Nothing at this scale operates without anchors in official structures — Regional Internet Registries, company registrars, state telecoms, regulators, financiers, carriers, and law enforcement. These are the documented anchors (sourced). The inferred ones live in the conspiratorial section below.
The connective tissue of this cluster is not a server — it is a piece of internet governance history. The shared cloudinnovation.org / +248 contact resolves to Cloud Innovation Ltd, the very entity at the centre of the long, bitter litigation against AFRINIC, the African Regional Internet Registry — a fight over millions of allegedly hoarded IPv4 addresses that nearly broke the registry. That entity is registered CIS1-AFRINIC and sits under the Seychelles Financial Services Authority. Around it, APNIC anchors Yisu, Scloud and UCloud, and the single Seychelles contact stitches four nominally-separate ASNs together. Above them tower the giants with dual state anchors: ByteDance/BytePlus, simultaneously investigated by the US Treasury's CFIUS and bound to PRC CAC oversight; Tencent, sitting under a Beijing golden-share entity. At the criminal floor, Omegatech is carried on Spamhaus DROP and abuse.ch ThreatFox. The same cluster touches a UN-adjacent registry war and two of the world's most politically-scrutinised technology companies.
๐ฏ Actors & Entities
| Actor / Entity | Type | Country | Risk | Conf. | Role |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tencent Cloud / ACEVILLE PTE.LTD. | hoster | CN/SG | HIGH | high | Large PRC-origin cloud provider; cluster IPs show Tencent/Aceville RDAP contacts and SSH abuse, especially JP-facing and SG-prefix discrepancies. |
| BytePlus Pte Ltd / ByteDance | hoster | SG/CN | HIGH | high | ByteDance enterprise/cloud arm with AS150436; honeypot saw brute-force/scanner activity and ByteDance abuse contacts. |
| UCloud Information Technology (HK) Limited / Zenlayer-adjacent space | hoster | HK/CN/US | MEDIUM | high | AS135377 is identified by DB as UCloud HK, with some IP RDAP records referencing Zenlayer Inc; activity includes probes, brute force, C2-classified IPs and broad country discrepancy. |
| Yisu Cloud Ltd | shell_company | HK/SC | HIGH | medium-high | HK cloud/reseller ASN pair AS138152/AS142403 with Seychelles-prefix/contact artifacts and high-threat marquee IPs. |
| Scloud Pte Ltd | shell_company | SG/SC | HIGH | medium-high | Singapore-labeled AS142002; DB flags bulletproof/Spamhaus ASN-DROP and shows Cloud Innovation/Seychelles contact overlap. |
| YSZ Trading Co., Limited | shell_company | HK | CRITICAL | medium-high | HK trading-company ASN AS211484 with high risk score, broad prefix geographies, and targeted SSH scan activity. |
| Omegatech LTD | criminal_group | SC | CRITICAL | high | Seychelles-registered AS202412, Spamhaus ASN-DROP and public reporting tie the ASN to dense malware C2 hosting; honeypot saw credential-stuffing with many successful logins. |
| Cloud Innovation Support | shell_company | SC/HK | HIGH | medium-high | Recurring RDAP/support entity across UCloud/Yisu/Scloud-linked IPs with Seychelles phone and cloudinnovation.org emails; likely reseller/support layer rather than end user. |
๐ Infrastructure & Indicators (IOCs)
| IP / Indicator | ASN | AS Name | Geo | Role | Threat |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
43.128.237.224 | AS132203 | Tencent Cloud / TENCENT-NET-AP | JP endpoint / SG prefix / JP RDAP / CN ASN | SSH scanner / marquee geo-discrepant host | 100 |
124.156.202.242 | AS132203 | Tencent Cloud / TENCENT-NET-AP | geo-discrepant Tencent space | botnet/C2-classified high-threat host | 100 |
103.143.238.100 | AS138152 | Yisu Cloud Ltd | US endpoint / HK prefix+RDAP | exploit/brute-force marquee Yisu host | 100 |
154.209.4.195 | AS142403 | Yisu Cloud Ltd | HK endpoint / SC prefix / HK RDAP | C2-classified/SSH abuse marquee Yisu host | 98 |
172.110.219.251 | AS211484 | YSZ Trading Co., Limited | ES endpoint / HK prefix+RDAP | targeted SSH scan marquee YSZ host | 100 |
185.135.157.99 | AS211484 | YSZ Trading Co., Limited | NL endpoint / AE or HK/SC routing context | brute-force/general abuse host | 74 |
94.154.35.215 | AS202412 | Omegatech LTD | NL endpoint / offshore ASN context | credential stuffing; 560 successful honeypot logins | 80 |
178.16.54.226 | AS202412 | Omegatech LTD | NL endpoint / Omegatech SC registrant | botnet/C2-classified host; 126 successful logins | 78 |
154.198.162.75 | AS142002 | Scloud Pte Ltd | HK endpoint / SC-SG routing context | brute force Scloud host | 73 |
165.154.255.63 | AS142002 | Scloud Pte Ltd | US endpoint / SG registrant | brute force Scloud host | 73 |
69.5.20.232 | AS150436 | BytePlus Pte Ltd | HK/ID/SG discrepancy set | BytePlus high-threat scanner/brute-force host | 91 |
165.154.6.119 | AS135377 | UCloud HK / Zenlayer-adjacent | multi-country UCloud/Zenlayer-adjacent space | high-threat brute-force/probe host | 95 |
Threat = composite 0โ100 score from honeypot activity + multi-source enrichment.
๐ Findings
| Severity | Conf. | Category | Finding |
|---|---|---|---|
| HIGH | high | geo_discrepancy | Geo-discrepancy is the cluster signature All eight ASNs show material disagreement between endpoint geolocation, Cymru prefix/origin country, and RDAP registrant country; 318+ local IPs in these ASNs were discrepant in DB aggregates. |
| HIGH | high | offshore | Seychelles appears as legal and routing camouflage Seychelles appears directly in AS202412, as SC prefix/origin artifacts in Yisu/Scloud/YSZ, and in recurring Cloud Innovation contact data. |
| HIGH | high | corporate | BytePlus/ByteDance cloud infrastructure is present in SSH abuse AS150436 is BytePlus Pte Ltd with ByteDance abuse contact; 49 local IPs produced 385 honeypot hits and 36 discrepant IPs, mostly brute force/general abuse. |
| HIGH | high | infrastructure | Tencent marquee IP demonstrates CN-SG-JP fronting 43.128.237.224 is Tencent AS132203 with threat score 100, 95 hits, JP endpoint geolocation, SG prefix country and JP RDAP while ASN registration is CN. |
| HIGH | medium-high | corporate | Yisu Cloud carries the clearest HK-to-SC reseller pattern AS138152/AS142403 are Yisu Cloud Ltd HK, but local IPs include SC Cymru country and Cloud Innovation/Seychelles support contacts. |
| HIGH | medium-high | infrastructure | Scloud overlaps the same Cloud Innovation/Seychelles contact graph AS142002 is Scloud Pte Ltd SG, but the honeypot DB flags it bulletproof/ASN-DROP and shows tech@cloudinnovation.org plus Seychelles phone on one observed IP. |
| CRITICAL | medium-high | corporate | YSZ Trading behaves like an HK shell/reseller ASN AS211484 is a Hong Kong trading-company ASN with 20 /24s, high risk score 92.3, three fully discrepant local IPs, and public WHOIS exposing a personal Gmail contact. |
| CRITICAL | high | infrastructure | Omegatech is criminal-hosting, not ordinary geo-noise AS202412 is Seychelles-registered, Spamhaus ASN-DROP, publicly reported as dense C2 infrastructure, and produced 753 successful honeypot logins locally. |
| MEDIUM | high | attribution | UCloud/Zenlayer attribution must be handled carefully AS135377 is labeled by DB and public sources as UCloud HK, while some local RDAP contacts reference Zenlayer Inc; the evidence supports infrastructure adjacency rather than Zenlayer-only ownership. |
| MEDIUM | high | infrastructure | Commodity scanner fingerprints recur across corporate boundaries libssh_0.9.6, libssh_0.11.1, libssh_0.12.0, libssh2 and Go scanner fingerprints recur across Tencent, UCloud, BytePlus, Yisu/Scloud and offshore ASNs. |
| HIGH | high | attribution | Credential patterns show opportunistic SSH abuse Top credentials include admin:admin on Omegatech, empty-root on YSZ, and broad application/cloud defaults on Tencent/BytePlus; this is credential stuffing and scanning behavior. |
| MEDIUM | low-medium | state_adjacency | State-adjacent hypothesis remains unproven PRC-origin clouds and HK/SC shells overlap, but no collected evidence directly links beneficial owners or tasking to Chinese state organs. |
| MEDIUM | medium | offshore | Seychelles IBC model explains the legal incentive Public offshore-company formation material markets Seychelles as an offshore/0% tax jurisdiction with registered-agent services and high privacy; this aligns with abuse infrastructure seeking distance and opacity. |
| MEDIUM | high | infrastructure | AS-level blocking differs by actor type Omegatech and YSZ are high-confidence block candidates; Tencent and BytePlus require per-IP blocking/reporting because they are large legitimate clouds. |
๐ณ๏ธ The Conspiratorial Read โ Questions & Calibrated Answers
Each answer states what the evidence supports and labels where a claim is unproven. Questions are instruments: they pry loose the partial truths the flat record hides.
โ What if the 'Hong Kong' shells are fronts for mainland Chinese operations?
The HKโSC reseller pattern (Yisu, YSZ) is consistent with putting an offshore legal buffer between mainland operators and Western complaint systems. We hold the routing/registration pattern at HIGH confidence; the specific beneficial owners stay hidden behind Seychelles IBC secrecy by design.
โ Is there a STATE-adjacency dimension, or is this purely commercial?
Unproven, and labelled as such (confidence LOW-MEDIUM). The data shows commercial bulletproof/offshore behaviour; it does not demonstrate a tie to China's cyber apparatus. We separate the documented commercial pattern from the unproven state hypothesis rather than collapse them.
โ Why is ByteDance/BytePlus infrastructure attacking SSH at all?
Two non-exclusive readings: compromised/abused tenant capacity on a large cloud, or commodity-scanner traffic riding BytePlus IP space. The RDAP uses bd_abuse@bytedance.com / IRT-BYTEPLUS-SG. We attribute the behaviour to the IP space, not to ByteDance corporate intent (confidence HIGH on presence, not on intent).
โ Who really owns Yisu, YSZ, Omegatech โ and what does Seychelles hide?
The shared Seychelles contact graph (cloudinnovation.org / +248 / omegatech.sc) links entities that present as independent. Seychelles IBCs disclose no beneficial ownership, so the corporate veil is the product. Attribution pivots on the shared contact/infra artifacts, which is why we map them explicitly.
โ Is this PRC state infrastructure, or commercial bulletproof wearing a Chinese face?
State-adjacency is documented at the ownership layer — CFIUS scrutiny of ByteDance, a golden share in Tencent — but operational tasking of the honeypot attacks is unproven (INFERRED). Presence is not direction. The defensible statement: politically-sensitive PRC-linked capacity is being used for opportunistic abuse; whether anyone in Beijing pointed it at us is not in evidence.
โ One telephone number holds four 'independent' companies — and the registry it fought is AFRINIC. Coincidence?
The contact continuity is high-confidence; common ownership is not proven (INFERRED). But the backdrop is documented and damning by association: the same Cloud Innovation identity that allegedly hoarded African IPv4 is the connective contact across this offshore cloud cluster. The registry war and the honeypot abuse share a phone number.
๐ Linked Dossiers
- TI-020A โ master thesis
- TI-019 "Shadow Nexus" โ Tencent/BytePlus weaponization context
- TI-020E โ Omegatech & offshore-shell registrants recur in the European cluster
- TI-019K โ Omegatech (Seychelles) also a vertex of the w1n Quadrant
๐ Sources & Evidence Chain (17 items)
Every claim above is anchored to a primary source. Full machine-readable evidence in Postgres dossier_intel (investigation 019M).
| Type | Evidence | Reliability | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| honeypot | Honeypot ASN discrepancy aggregate | high | local:sec_intel_query:asn-discrepancy-aggregate |
| honeypot | Marquee IP discrepancy table | high | local:sec_intel_query:marquee-ip-table |
| whois | Tencent/Aceville RDAP contacts | high | https://www.tencentcloud.com/ |
| osint | BytePlus is ByteDance enterprise cloud arm | high | https://aibusiness.com/verticals/tiktok-parent-bytedance-launches-byte |
| honeypot | BytePlus honeypot activity | high | local:sec_intel_query:asn-and-contact-aggregates |
| whois | Yisu public ASN registration | medium-high | https://whois.ipip.net/AS138152 |
| honeypot | Cloud Innovation Seychelles contact pivot | high | local:sec_intel_query:rdap-contact-pivot |
| honeypot | Scloud honeypot dossier facts | medium-high | https://bgp.tools/as/142002 |
| whois | YSZ public ASN registration | medium-high | https://whois.ipip.net/AS211484 |
| honeypot | YSZ honeypot dossier facts | high | local:sec_intel_asn_dossier:211484 |
| news | Omegatech public BPH reporting | medium-high | https://intel.breakglass.tech/post/omegatech-bph-as202412-67-c2-server |
| honeypot | Omegatech honeypot dossier facts | high | local:sec_intel_asn_dossier:202412 |
| corporate | Seychelles offshore company privacy context | medium | https://astra-trust.com/corporate/seychelles-company-registration-with |
| technical | Honeypot HASSH fingerprint aggregate | high | local:sec_intel_query:hassh-aggregate |
| technical | Honeypot credential aggregate | high | local:sec_intel_query:credential-aggregate |
| osint | UCloud and Zenlayer attribution caveat | medium-high | https://bgp.tools/as/135377 |
| osint | Zenlayer public distributed-cloud positioning | high | https://www.zenlayer.com/ |