Executive Summary
M247 Europe SRL, registered in Romania under AS9009, operates one of the world's largest hosting networks: 5,000 IPv4 prefixes, 500 IPv6 prefixes, 60 Internet Exchange Points, 53 data center facilities, 5-10 Tbps of transit traffic. It has absorbed five companies โ Globalaxs Communications, OHTele, Axamba, WebTapestry, SOInternet โ building a global infrastructure empire from a Bucharest registration.
Our honeypot captured 47 M247 IPs. The story they tell splits cleanly in two: 19 Romanian IPs with an average threat score of 7.4, and 19 American IPs with an average threat score of 70.4 โ every single one at 100% abuse confidence. All 19 American IPs belong to a single entity: Servers Factory LLC, registered with a Delaware phone number and the email iphostmaster@serversfactory.com.
This is not a hosting company that has an abuse problem. This is an infrastructure empire that has built plausible deniability into its corporate topology.
๐๏ธ Key Finding: The Architecture of Distance
M247's Romanian IPs report themselves as infrastructure for Venezuela, Bahamas, Qatar, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, Panama, Saudi Arabia, Shenzhen, Dublin, and the Isle of Man. Every one of these IPs physically geolocates to Romania. The RDAP registrations create an illusion of geographical distribution that does not exist in the physical layer.
This is not a CDN. CDNs put servers where users are. This is a jurisdiction-washing machine โ the same Romanian rack, wearing eleven different national costumes.
๐ Exhibit A: The Two Faces of M247
| Country | IPs | Avg Threat | Avg Abuse | Total Reports | Dominant Entity |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ๐บ๐ธ US | 19 | 70.4 | 100.0 | 4,124 | Servers Factory LLC |
| ๐จ๐ญ CH | 1 | 66.0 | 100.0 | 6,112 | M247 LTD Zurich (SDAT-MNT) |
| ๐ธ๐ช SE | 1 | 50.0 | 100.0 | 53 | EDIS GmbH |
| ๐ฉ๐ช DE | 2 | 36.6 | 71.5 | 134 | EDIS GmbH / Virtono |
| ๐ช๐ธ ES | 2 | 26.2 | 53.0 | 52 | Virtono Networks SRL |
| ๐ฌ๐ง GB | 3 | 12.0 | 0.0 | 0 | Servers Factory LLC |
| ๐ท๐ด RO | 19 | 7.4 | 27.9 | 97 | M247 Europe SRL |
Same ASN. Same company. The American half generates 42ร more abuse reports per IP than the Romanian half. The Swiss IP alone โ a single machine in Zurich โ has 6,112 AbuseIPDB reports, more than all 19 Romanian IPs combined by a factor of 63.
๐ Exhibit B: The Naming Ceremony
Within a single autonomous system, M247 operates under at least 10 distinct organizational identities. Each RDAP registration tells a different story about who owns the IP space:
| ISP Name | RDAP Organization | Contact Email | Geo |
|---|---|---|---|
| Servers Factory LLC | serversf-mnt | iphostmaster@serversfactory.com | US/GB |
| M247 LTD Venezuela Infrastructure | M247 Ltd Venezuela | abuse@m247.ro | RO |
| M247 LTD, Bahamas Infrastructure | M247 Ltd Bahamas | abuse@m247.ro | RO |
| M247 LTD, Doha Infrastructure | M247 Ltd Qatar | abuse@m247.ro | RO |
| M247 LTD, Shenzen Infrastructure | M247 Ltd Shenzen | abuse@m247.ro | RO |
| M247 LTD, Sri Lanka Infrastructure | M247 Ltd Sri Lanka | abuse@m247.ro | RO |
| M247 LTD Nigeria Infrastructure | M247 Ltd Lagos | abuse@m247.ro | RO |
| M247 LTD Panama Infrastructure | M247 Ltd - Panama | abuse@m247.ro | RO |
| M247 LTD-Dublin Infrastructure | M247 Ltd - Isle of Man | abuse@m247.ro | RO |
| M247 Ltd Saudi Arabia | M247 Ltd Saudi Arabia | abuse@m247.ro | RO |
Every single "M247 Ltd [Country]" IP physically geolocates to Romania and uses the same abuse contact: abuse@m247.ro. The Venezuelan infrastructure is in Bucharest. The Bahamas infrastructure is in Bucharest. The Sri Lankan infrastructure is in Bucharest. The naming convention is the infrastructure equivalent of a passport forgery ring โ except it's legal.
๐ Exhibit C: Servers Factory LLC โ The Attack Arm
Of M247's 47 observed IPs, 20 are registered under Servers Factory LLC with the contact email iphostmaster@serversfactory.com and a Delaware phone number: +1(302) 327 4003.
| IP | Threat | Abuse | Reports | Behavior |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 185.255.100.242 | 100 | 100 | 280 | C2 infrastructure, SSH brute-force |
| 185.255.100.196 | 100 | 100 | 256 | C2 infrastructure, SSH brute-force |
| 185.255.100.198 | 98 | 100 | 681 | DDoS (83 reports), SSH (90 reports) |
| 185.255.100.250 | 85 | 100 | 312 | SSH brute-force, scanning |
| 185.255.100.236 | 85 | 100 | 312 | SSH brute-force, scanning |
| 185.255.100.202 | 78 | 100 | 143 | General abuse, credential stuffing |
| 185.255.100.251 | 75 | 100 | 332 | SSH brute-force, DDoS |
| 185.255.100.194 | 74 | 100 | 219 | Exploit attempts, scanning |
| 185.255.100.203 | 72 | 100 | 187 | Port scanning, brute-force |
| 185.255.100.14 | 71 | 100 | 199 | SSH brute-force |
Every Servers Factory IP has an abuse confidence of 100%. The AbuseIPDB categorization for IP 185.255.100.198 reads: DDoS (83 reports), SSH abuse (90 reports), Port Scanning (9 reports), Brute-Force (13 reports). A single IP, 114 distinct reporters, 371 total reports. This is not an outlier. This is the median.
Three Servers Factory IPs are registered to the UK but report zero abuse. The remaining 17, registered to the US, have an average threat score of 72.6. Same company, same IP block (185.255.100.0/24). The UK-registered ones are the showroom. The US-registered ones are the factory floor.
๐ Exhibit D: The Subsidiary Ecosystem
M247's AS9009 hosts IPs registered to entities that appear independent but route through the same autonomous system:
| Entity | Abuse Contact | Relationship | IPs in AS9009 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Virtono Networks SRL | abuse@virtono.com / abuse-virtono@rnc.ro | Romanian SRL, routes through M247 | 3 (DE, ES, RO) |
| EDIS GmbH | abuse@edis.at | Austrian company, uses M247 transit | 3 (US, DE, SE) |
| OVO Systems Ltd. | abuse@ovo.sc | Seychelles registration (.sc) | 1 (RO, Tor exit) |
| Hosteroid | abuse@hosteroid.uk | UK-registered, .uk domain | 1 (RO, Tor exit) |
| GLOBALAXS Dubai NOC | abuse@m247.ro | Dubai NOC, same M247 abuse email | 1 (RO) |
| TFB NET | jamesl@mythostech.com | MythosTech relationship | 1 (US) |
| SDAT-MNT | abuse@s-data.ro | Romanian S-Data, Zurich IP | 1 (CH) |
Count the jurisdictions: Romania, Austria, Seychelles, UK, Dubai, US, Switzerland. Count the abuse contacts: 7 different email domains. Count the underlying infrastructure: one autonomous system, one set of peering agreements, one routing table. The corporate complexity exists in the legal layer. The infrastructure is singular.
๐ Exhibit E: The Fingerprint โ 628 Nodes, 48 Countries, One Tool
23 of M247's 47 IPs โ 49% of the total โ share the identical HASSH fingerprint 14b2ddda386a4d1006108ccd231b42fc, corresponding to libssh2 version 1.11.0. This fingerprint belongs to a global scanning campaign:
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Total IPs in campaign | 628 |
| Countries spanned | 48 |
| Total honeypot attempts | 16,253 |
| Successful logins | 0 |
| Campaign classification | Scanner |
| M247/Servers Factory IPs in campaign | 23 (3.7% of total) |
The campaign's top 5 ASNs tell the story of who provides infrastructure for mass scanning:
| Rank | ASN | Provider | IPs | Avg Threat |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | AS16276 | OVH SAS (France) | 45 | 71.8 |
| 2 | AS32475 | Internap/SingleHop (US) | 39 | 70.5 |
| 3 | AS40676 | Psychz Networks (US) | 34 | 62.8 |
| 4 | AS36352 | ColoCrossing/HostPapa (US) | 33 | 72.1 |
| 5 | AS35916 | MULTACOM (US) | 26 | 64.1 |
| 7 | AS9009 | M247 Europe SRL (RO) | 20 | 71.2 |
M247 ranks 7th globally in providing infrastructure for this campaign. The top providers are the same names that appear in our Kill Chain Economy series (TI-2026-035): OVH, SingleHop, Psychz, ColoCrossing, MULTACOM. These are not independent operations. They are the same ecosystem viewed through different corporate registrations.
๐ Exhibit F: The Tor Layer
Four M247 IPs in our dataset operate as Tor exit nodes or relay infrastructure:
| IP | Country | Entity | Hostname | Threat |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 83.97.20.77 | RO | OVO Systems Ltd. (Seychelles) | teap0t.com / exit.teap0t.com | 43.4 |
| 194.53.137.102 | ES | Virtono Networks SRL | โ | 28.6 |
| 194.53.137.156 | RO | Virtono Networks SRL | โ | 5.0 |
| 62.133.45.2 | RO | Hosteroid (.uk domain) | โ | 5.0 |
Note the pattern: the Tor exits are not registered to M247 directly. They are registered to subsidiaries โ OVO Systems (Seychelles), Virtono (Romania), Hosteroid (UK). If a Tor exit node gets seized, the trail leads to a subsidiary, not to M247 Europe SRL. If a law enforcement request arrives, it goes to a different abuse contact in a different jurisdiction. The parent company maintains plausible distance.
๐ Exhibit G: The SSH Key Bridge
Our SSH key analysis found two shared key fingerprints connecting M247/Servers Factory IPs to external infrastructure:
| Key Fingerprint | IPs Sharing | Implication |
|---|---|---|
b6:32:47:40:ef:36:85:2a:b3:a6:37:22:e5:89:34:67 | 2 | Same operator or deployment template |
e0:38:78:d0:84:e0:55:64:91:47:d4:be:8d:5b:f5:77 | 2 | Same operator or deployment template |
Additionally, the Servers Factory IP 185.255.100.198 shares SSH keys with:
- 198.46.134.148 โ via key
7d:82:06:b9:52:f7:94:99:e7:a4:2f:1e:0e:77:b8:4d - 45.142.3.73 โ via key
77:60:de:e8:2f:d6:c7:97:6e:ad:96:a8:1d:fc:63:11
SSH key sharing across different ASNs and countries means the same private key was deployed on machines in different networks. Either the same operator controls both endpoints, or the same provisioning system deployed them. Neither explanation is innocent.
๐ Exhibit H: The Zurich Anomaly
One IP demands special attention: 37.120.213.13, registered to M247 LTD Zurich via SDAT-MNT (abuse@s-data.ro โ note: a Romanian abuse contact for a Swiss IP).
- Threat score: 66.0
- Abuse confidence: 100%
- AbuseIPDB reports: 6,112
- OTX pulse count: 50 (highest in the dataset)
- Appears in honeypot feeds from: Australia, South Korea, US, Japan, Germany
Pulse names include: "PurpleSynapz," "SSH Brute-Force Honeypot Live," "T-Pot Sydney," "RaspiNAS SSH + Web Honeypot Live Feed." This single Swiss IP appears in 50 threat intelligence feeds simultaneously. It has been reported by honeypot operators on every inhabited continent. And it continues to operate.
6,112 abuse reports. 50 threat intelligence feeds. Still online. Still scanning. The abuse contact is a Romanian email address for a Swiss IP operated by a Romanian company through an Austrian registration. How many jurisdictions must you cross to file an effective complaint?
โ The Questions Nobody Is Asking
M247 Europe SRL was allocated AS9009 on June 6, 2005. PeeringDB lists 5 acquired companies: Globalaxs Communications, OHTele, Axamba, WebTapestry, SOInternet. The current network handles 5-10 Tbps of traffic across 53 facilities. From a Bucharest SRL to a Tier-2 transit provider in 21 years.
The acquisition trail reveals the strategy: buy small hosting companies, absorb their IP allocations, keep the brand names for subsidiaries, consolidate routing under one ASN. Each acquisition brings IP blocks, customer contracts, and โ crucially โ peering agreements. The company doesn't grow organically. It assembles itself from parts.
"M247 Ltd Venezuela Infrastructure," "M247 Ltd Bahamas," "M247 Ltd Qatar," "M247 Ltd Sri Lanka" โ all geolocate to Romania. All use abuse@m247.ro as their contact. The only thing that changes is the RDAP registration.
Possible legitimate explanation: VPN exit nodes. Customers buy a "Venezuelan VPN" and get a Romanian server with a Venezuelan IP registration. This is standard practice for VPN providers.
The darker reading: Jurisdiction arbitrage. A complaint about "M247 Ltd Bahamas" goes to... whom? The Bahamas regulatory authority? They'll find no physical infrastructure. The Romanian regulator? The registration says Bahamas. The complaint enters a jurisdictional void where no authority has clear ownership.
20 of 47 IPs in AS9009 are registered to Servers Factory LLC. All US-located Servers Factory IPs have 100% abuse confidence. All carry the same /24 prefix: 185.255.100.0/24. The RDAP contact is iphostmaster@serversfactory.com with a Delaware phone number.
Servers Factory LLC appears as the third-largest registrant in the libssh2_1.11.0 global scanning campaign, contributing 17 IPs. The domain serversfactory.com is the RDAP contact for addresses carrying the serversf-mnt maintainer tag.
Is this a customer of M247? A subsidiary? A shell company? The IPs route through AS9009. The abuse reports go to serversfactory.com. The physical infrastructure sits in M247's network. If these are independent companies, they share a backbone. If they're the same company, the corporate separation is cosmetic.
23 of 47 M247 IPs share the libssh2_1.11.0 HASSH fingerprint. This campaign has 16,253 honeypot attempts across 48 countries with zero successful logins โ pure reconnaissance, systematic scanning of the entire SSH-exposed internet.
The campaign's infrastructure providers read like a directory of the hosting industry's abuse-tolerant tier: OVH (45 IPs), SingleHop (39), Psychz (34), ColoCrossing (33), MULTACOM (26). M247 sits comfortably at position 7 with 20 IPs. These are not hacked customer servers. These are dedicated scanning nodes deployed on hosting infrastructure.
A legitimate hosting provider with 49% of its observed IPs participating in coordinated scanning would be investigated. M247 is not investigated. M247 operates 60 IXPs.
OVO Systems Ltd. (Seychelles) runs the teap0t.com Tor exit from Romania. Virtono Networks SRL (Romania) runs exits from both Spain and Romania. Hosteroid (UK) runs an exit from Romania. Three companies, three jurisdictions, one ASN, one country of physical operation.
The Tor Project would say: This is diversity. Multiple exit operators improve the network's resilience against single points of failure.
The forensic reading: If all three "operators" route through the same ASN from the same physical location, the diversity is theatrical. A single Romanian court order would compromise all three exits. But a Seychelles incorporation, a UK domain, and a Romanian SRL create the appearance of independence that the Tor directory relies on to assess relay diversity.
โ๏ธ Assessment
Confidence: HIGH โ Direct evidence from honeypot telemetry, RDAP/PeeringDB records, AbuseIPDB reports, and HASSH fingerprint correlation.
M247 is not a rogue operation. It is not a bulletproof host. Spamhaus does not list it. Its risk score (44.0) is moderate. It peers at 60 IXPs and handles terabits of traffic. It is, by every institutional measure, a legitimate infrastructure provider.
And yet: 19 of its IPs have 100% abuse confidence. One IP has 6,112 abuse reports across 50 threat intelligence feeds. Half its observed fleet participates in a 628-node scanning campaign across 48 countries. Its Tor exits are operated through a nested hierarchy of international subsidiaries. Its RDAP registrations claim infrastructure in countries where no physical infrastructure exists.
This is what empire looks like in the infrastructure layer. Not a single criminal act, but a corporate architecture designed to make accountability structurally impossible. Too big to be bulletproof. Too distributed to be regulated. Too legitimate to be blocked. Too complex to be understood.
The Romanian Corridor doesn't run through back alleys. It runs through 60 Internet Exchange Points, 53 data centers, and 5,000 IPv4 prefixes. The corridor is the infrastructure itself.
๐ Cross-Investigation Links
- TI-2026-035E "The Geography of Impunity" โ M247's subsidiary structure exemplifies the jurisdictional arbitrage pattern identified across the Kill Chain Economy
- TI-2026-035K "The Convergence" โ M247 appears as a transit provider enabling the convergence of cybercrime, surveillance, and state-sponsored operations
- TI-2026-036A "The Romanian Corridor" โ Overview of Romania's role as infrastructure corridor, where M247 is the dominant player
- TI-2026-036C "The SRL Factory" (forthcoming) โ How Romanian corporate law enables the M247 subsidiary structure