LSN โ€” Local Sovereign Network

Executive Summary

M247 Europe SRL, registered in Romania under AS9009, operates one of the world's largest hosting networks: 5,000 IPv4 prefixes, 500 IPv6 prefixes, 60 Internet Exchange Points, 53 data center facilities, 5-10 Tbps of transit traffic. It has absorbed five companies โ€” Globalaxs Communications, OHTele, Axamba, WebTapestry, SOInternet โ€” building a global infrastructure empire from a Bucharest registration.

Our honeypot captured 47 M247 IPs. The story they tell splits cleanly in two: 19 Romanian IPs with an average threat score of 7.4, and 19 American IPs with an average threat score of 70.4 โ€” every single one at 100% abuse confidence. All 19 American IPs belong to a single entity: Servers Factory LLC, registered with a Delaware phone number and the email iphostmaster@serversfactory.com.

This is not a hosting company that has an abuse problem. This is an infrastructure empire that has built plausible deniability into its corporate topology.

๐Ÿ—๏ธ Key Finding: The Architecture of Distance

M247's Romanian IPs report themselves as infrastructure for Venezuela, Bahamas, Qatar, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, Panama, Saudi Arabia, Shenzhen, Dublin, and the Isle of Man. Every one of these IPs physically geolocates to Romania. The RDAP registrations create an illusion of geographical distribution that does not exist in the physical layer.

This is not a CDN. CDNs put servers where users are. This is a jurisdiction-washing machine โ€” the same Romanian rack, wearing eleven different national costumes.

๐Ÿ“Š Exhibit A: The Two Faces of M247

CountryIPsAvg ThreatAvg AbuseTotal ReportsDominant Entity
๐Ÿ‡บ๐Ÿ‡ธ US1970.4100.04,124Servers Factory LLC
๐Ÿ‡จ๐Ÿ‡ญ CH166.0100.06,112M247 LTD Zurich (SDAT-MNT)
๐Ÿ‡ธ๐Ÿ‡ช SE150.0100.053EDIS GmbH
๐Ÿ‡ฉ๐Ÿ‡ช DE236.671.5134EDIS GmbH / Virtono
๐Ÿ‡ช๐Ÿ‡ธ ES226.253.052Virtono Networks SRL
๐Ÿ‡ฌ๐Ÿ‡ง GB312.00.00Servers Factory LLC
๐Ÿ‡ท๐Ÿ‡ด RO197.427.997M247 Europe SRL

Same ASN. Same company. The American half generates 42ร— more abuse reports per IP than the Romanian half. The Swiss IP alone โ€” a single machine in Zurich โ€” has 6,112 AbuseIPDB reports, more than all 19 Romanian IPs combined by a factor of 63.

๐Ÿ“Š Exhibit B: The Naming Ceremony

Within a single autonomous system, M247 operates under at least 10 distinct organizational identities. Each RDAP registration tells a different story about who owns the IP space:

ISP NameRDAP OrganizationContact EmailGeo
Servers Factory LLCserversf-mntiphostmaster@serversfactory.comUS/GB
M247 LTD Venezuela InfrastructureM247 Ltd Venezuelaabuse@m247.roRO
M247 LTD, Bahamas InfrastructureM247 Ltd Bahamasabuse@m247.roRO
M247 LTD, Doha InfrastructureM247 Ltd Qatarabuse@m247.roRO
M247 LTD, Shenzen InfrastructureM247 Ltd Shenzenabuse@m247.roRO
M247 LTD, Sri Lanka InfrastructureM247 Ltd Sri Lankaabuse@m247.roRO
M247 LTD Nigeria InfrastructureM247 Ltd Lagosabuse@m247.roRO
M247 LTD Panama InfrastructureM247 Ltd - Panamaabuse@m247.roRO
M247 LTD-Dublin InfrastructureM247 Ltd - Isle of Manabuse@m247.roRO
M247 Ltd Saudi ArabiaM247 Ltd Saudi Arabiaabuse@m247.roRO

Every single "M247 Ltd [Country]" IP physically geolocates to Romania and uses the same abuse contact: abuse@m247.ro. The Venezuelan infrastructure is in Bucharest. The Bahamas infrastructure is in Bucharest. The Sri Lankan infrastructure is in Bucharest. The naming convention is the infrastructure equivalent of a passport forgery ring โ€” except it's legal.

๐Ÿ“Š Exhibit C: Servers Factory LLC โ€” The Attack Arm

Of M247's 47 observed IPs, 20 are registered under Servers Factory LLC with the contact email iphostmaster@serversfactory.com and a Delaware phone number: +1(302) 327 4003.

IPThreatAbuseReportsBehavior
185.255.100.242100100280C2 infrastructure, SSH brute-force
185.255.100.196100100256C2 infrastructure, SSH brute-force
185.255.100.19898100681DDoS (83 reports), SSH (90 reports)
185.255.100.25085100312SSH brute-force, scanning
185.255.100.23685100312SSH brute-force, scanning
185.255.100.20278100143General abuse, credential stuffing
185.255.100.25175100332SSH brute-force, DDoS
185.255.100.19474100219Exploit attempts, scanning
185.255.100.20372100187Port scanning, brute-force
185.255.100.1471100199SSH brute-force

Every Servers Factory IP has an abuse confidence of 100%. The AbuseIPDB categorization for IP 185.255.100.198 reads: DDoS (83 reports), SSH abuse (90 reports), Port Scanning (9 reports), Brute-Force (13 reports). A single IP, 114 distinct reporters, 371 total reports. This is not an outlier. This is the median.

Three Servers Factory IPs are registered to the UK but report zero abuse. The remaining 17, registered to the US, have an average threat score of 72.6. Same company, same IP block (185.255.100.0/24). The UK-registered ones are the showroom. The US-registered ones are the factory floor.

๐Ÿ“Š Exhibit D: The Subsidiary Ecosystem

M247's AS9009 hosts IPs registered to entities that appear independent but route through the same autonomous system:

EntityAbuse ContactRelationshipIPs in AS9009
Virtono Networks SRLabuse@virtono.com / abuse-virtono@rnc.roRomanian SRL, routes through M2473 (DE, ES, RO)
EDIS GmbHabuse@edis.atAustrian company, uses M247 transit3 (US, DE, SE)
OVO Systems Ltd.abuse@ovo.scSeychelles registration (.sc)1 (RO, Tor exit)
Hosteroidabuse@hosteroid.ukUK-registered, .uk domain1 (RO, Tor exit)
GLOBALAXS Dubai NOCabuse@m247.roDubai NOC, same M247 abuse email1 (RO)
TFB NETjamesl@mythostech.comMythosTech relationship1 (US)
SDAT-MNTabuse@s-data.roRomanian S-Data, Zurich IP1 (CH)

Count the jurisdictions: Romania, Austria, Seychelles, UK, Dubai, US, Switzerland. Count the abuse contacts: 7 different email domains. Count the underlying infrastructure: one autonomous system, one set of peering agreements, one routing table. The corporate complexity exists in the legal layer. The infrastructure is singular.

๐Ÿ“Š Exhibit E: The Fingerprint โ€” 628 Nodes, 48 Countries, One Tool

23 of M247's 47 IPs โ€” 49% of the total โ€” share the identical HASSH fingerprint 14b2ddda386a4d1006108ccd231b42fc, corresponding to libssh2 version 1.11.0. This fingerprint belongs to a global scanning campaign:

MetricValue
Total IPs in campaign628
Countries spanned48
Total honeypot attempts16,253
Successful logins0
Campaign classificationScanner
M247/Servers Factory IPs in campaign23 (3.7% of total)

The campaign's top 5 ASNs tell the story of who provides infrastructure for mass scanning:

RankASNProviderIPsAvg Threat
1AS16276OVH SAS (France)4571.8
2AS32475Internap/SingleHop (US)3970.5
3AS40676Psychz Networks (US)3462.8
4AS36352ColoCrossing/HostPapa (US)3372.1
5AS35916MULTACOM (US)2664.1
7AS9009M247 Europe SRL (RO)2071.2

M247 ranks 7th globally in providing infrastructure for this campaign. The top providers are the same names that appear in our Kill Chain Economy series (TI-2026-035): OVH, SingleHop, Psychz, ColoCrossing, MULTACOM. These are not independent operations. They are the same ecosystem viewed through different corporate registrations.

๐Ÿ“Š Exhibit F: The Tor Layer

Four M247 IPs in our dataset operate as Tor exit nodes or relay infrastructure:

IPCountryEntityHostnameThreat
83.97.20.77ROOVO Systems Ltd. (Seychelles)teap0t.com / exit.teap0t.com43.4
194.53.137.102ESVirtono Networks SRLโ€”28.6
194.53.137.156ROVirtono Networks SRLโ€”5.0
62.133.45.2ROHosteroid (.uk domain)โ€”5.0

Note the pattern: the Tor exits are not registered to M247 directly. They are registered to subsidiaries โ€” OVO Systems (Seychelles), Virtono (Romania), Hosteroid (UK). If a Tor exit node gets seized, the trail leads to a subsidiary, not to M247 Europe SRL. If a law enforcement request arrives, it goes to a different abuse contact in a different jurisdiction. The parent company maintains plausible distance.

๐Ÿ“Š Exhibit G: The SSH Key Bridge

Our SSH key analysis found two shared key fingerprints connecting M247/Servers Factory IPs to external infrastructure:

Key FingerprintIPs SharingImplication
b6:32:47:40:ef:36:85:2a:b3:a6:37:22:e5:89:34:672Same operator or deployment template
e0:38:78:d0:84:e0:55:64:91:47:d4:be:8d:5b:f5:772Same operator or deployment template

Additionally, the Servers Factory IP 185.255.100.198 shares SSH keys with:

  • 198.46.134.148 โ€” via key 7d:82:06:b9:52:f7:94:99:e7:a4:2f:1e:0e:77:b8:4d
  • 45.142.3.73 โ€” via key 77:60:de:e8:2f:d6:c7:97:6e:ad:96:a8:1d:fc:63:11

SSH key sharing across different ASNs and countries means the same private key was deployed on machines in different networks. Either the same operator controls both endpoints, or the same provisioning system deployed them. Neither explanation is innocent.

๐Ÿ“Š Exhibit H: The Zurich Anomaly

One IP demands special attention: 37.120.213.13, registered to M247 LTD Zurich via SDAT-MNT (abuse@s-data.ro โ€” note: a Romanian abuse contact for a Swiss IP).

  • Threat score: 66.0
  • Abuse confidence: 100%
  • AbuseIPDB reports: 6,112
  • OTX pulse count: 50 (highest in the dataset)
  • Appears in honeypot feeds from: Australia, South Korea, US, Japan, Germany

Pulse names include: "PurpleSynapz," "SSH Brute-Force Honeypot Live," "T-Pot Sydney," "RaspiNAS SSH + Web Honeypot Live Feed." This single Swiss IP appears in 50 threat intelligence feeds simultaneously. It has been reported by honeypot operators on every inhabited continent. And it continues to operate.

6,112 abuse reports. 50 threat intelligence feeds. Still online. Still scanning. The abuse contact is a Romanian email address for a Swiss IP operated by a Romanian company through an Austrian registration. How many jurisdictions must you cross to file an effective complaint?

โ“ The Questions Nobody Is Asking

Q1 How does a Romanian SRL come to operate 5,000 IPv4 prefixes across 60 IXPs?

M247 Europe SRL was allocated AS9009 on June 6, 2005. PeeringDB lists 5 acquired companies: Globalaxs Communications, OHTele, Axamba, WebTapestry, SOInternet. The current network handles 5-10 Tbps of traffic across 53 facilities. From a Bucharest SRL to a Tier-2 transit provider in 21 years.

The acquisition trail reveals the strategy: buy small hosting companies, absorb their IP allocations, keep the brand names for subsidiaries, consolidate routing under one ASN. Each acquisition brings IP blocks, customer contracts, and โ€” crucially โ€” peering agreements. The company doesn't grow organically. It assembles itself from parts.

Q2 Why does a legitimate hosting company need 10 different national subsidiaries that all physically operate from Romania?

"M247 Ltd Venezuela Infrastructure," "M247 Ltd Bahamas," "M247 Ltd Qatar," "M247 Ltd Sri Lanka" โ€” all geolocate to Romania. All use abuse@m247.ro as their contact. The only thing that changes is the RDAP registration.

Possible legitimate explanation: VPN exit nodes. Customers buy a "Venezuelan VPN" and get a Romanian server with a Venezuelan IP registration. This is standard practice for VPN providers.

The darker reading: Jurisdiction arbitrage. A complaint about "M247 Ltd Bahamas" goes to... whom? The Bahamas regulatory authority? They'll find no physical infrastructure. The Romanian regulator? The registration says Bahamas. The complaint enters a jurisdictional void where no authority has clear ownership.

Q3 What is the relationship between M247 Europe SRL and Servers Factory LLC?

20 of 47 IPs in AS9009 are registered to Servers Factory LLC. All US-located Servers Factory IPs have 100% abuse confidence. All carry the same /24 prefix: 185.255.100.0/24. The RDAP contact is iphostmaster@serversfactory.com with a Delaware phone number.

Servers Factory LLC appears as the third-largest registrant in the libssh2_1.11.0 global scanning campaign, contributing 17 IPs. The domain serversfactory.com is the RDAP contact for addresses carrying the serversf-mnt maintainer tag.

Is this a customer of M247? A subsidiary? A shell company? The IPs route through AS9009. The abuse reports go to serversfactory.com. The physical infrastructure sits in M247's network. If these are independent companies, they share a backbone. If they're the same company, the corporate separation is cosmetic.

Q4 If 49% of your IPs participate in a global 628-node scanning botnet, what exactly are you selling?

23 of 47 M247 IPs share the libssh2_1.11.0 HASSH fingerprint. This campaign has 16,253 honeypot attempts across 48 countries with zero successful logins โ€” pure reconnaissance, systematic scanning of the entire SSH-exposed internet.

The campaign's infrastructure providers read like a directory of the hosting industry's abuse-tolerant tier: OVH (45 IPs), SingleHop (39), Psychz (34), ColoCrossing (33), MULTACOM (26). M247 sits comfortably at position 7 with 20 IPs. These are not hacked customer servers. These are dedicated scanning nodes deployed on hosting infrastructure.

A legitimate hosting provider with 49% of its observed IPs participating in coordinated scanning would be investigated. M247 is not investigated. M247 operates 60 IXPs.

Q5 Why do M247's Tor exit nodes run through subsidiaries registered in three different countries?

OVO Systems Ltd. (Seychelles) runs the teap0t.com Tor exit from Romania. Virtono Networks SRL (Romania) runs exits from both Spain and Romania. Hosteroid (UK) runs an exit from Romania. Three companies, three jurisdictions, one ASN, one country of physical operation.

The Tor Project would say: This is diversity. Multiple exit operators improve the network's resilience against single points of failure.

The forensic reading: If all three "operators" route through the same ASN from the same physical location, the diversity is theatrical. A single Romanian court order would compromise all three exits. But a Seychelles incorporation, a UK domain, and a Romanian SRL create the appearance of independence that the Tor directory relies on to assess relay diversity.

โš–๏ธ Assessment

Confidence: HIGH โ€” Direct evidence from honeypot telemetry, RDAP/PeeringDB records, AbuseIPDB reports, and HASSH fingerprint correlation.

M247 is not a rogue operation. It is not a bulletproof host. Spamhaus does not list it. Its risk score (44.0) is moderate. It peers at 60 IXPs and handles terabits of traffic. It is, by every institutional measure, a legitimate infrastructure provider.

And yet: 19 of its IPs have 100% abuse confidence. One IP has 6,112 abuse reports across 50 threat intelligence feeds. Half its observed fleet participates in a 628-node scanning campaign across 48 countries. Its Tor exits are operated through a nested hierarchy of international subsidiaries. Its RDAP registrations claim infrastructure in countries where no physical infrastructure exists.

This is what empire looks like in the infrastructure layer. Not a single criminal act, but a corporate architecture designed to make accountability structurally impossible. Too big to be bulletproof. Too distributed to be regulated. Too legitimate to be blocked. Too complex to be understood.

The Romanian Corridor doesn't run through back alleys. It runs through 60 Internet Exchange Points, 53 data centers, and 5,000 IPv4 prefixes. The corridor is the infrastructure itself.

โš  Personal capacity. Research published independently โ€” not reflecting employer views. Derived from passive observation of attacks against personal infrastructure. Full disclaimer โ†’
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