One phone number. Thirty-nine malicious IPs. When you call +603-57216174, does anyone answer?
The abuse reporting system assumes someone cares. The data assumes otherwise.
The Compliance Theater
Every IP allocation requires an abuse contact. Every abuse contact receives reports. The system assumes these reports create accountability. But when 11,324 shared abuse phone relationships and 3,873 shared email clusters point to contacts that collectively receive hundreds of thousands of reports without meaningful action, the system is performing a ritual rather than a function.
ISPs by Total Abuse Reports (Inaction Scale)
| ISP/Organization | IPs Tracked | Abuse Score | Reports Received | Reports/IP |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Microsoft Corporation | 297 | 88.8 | 273,182 | 920 |
| ISAEV Igor | 8 | 88.5 | 264,349 | 33,044 |
| TECHOFF SRV LIMITED | 8 | 96.8 | 165,706 | 20,713 |
| Korea Telecom | 57 | 97.9 | 156,303 | 2,742 |
| NL MODAT | 23 | 100.0 | 147,040 | 6,393 |
| APNIC | 102 | 98.7 | 120,297 | 1,179 |
| UCloud HK | 36 | 100.0 | 114,707 | 3,186 |
| PROSPERO OOO | 1 | 100.0 | 102,008 | 102,008 |
| DigitalOcean | 192 | 82.9 | 105,988 | 552 |
| ACEVILLE PTE LTD | 58 | 98.3 | 86,263 | 1,487 |
The Per-IP Champions
Reports-per-IP reveals the truly unresponsive:
PROSPERO OOO: 102,008 reports for a single IP address. One hundred thousand abuse reports. For one server. Still online. This isn't negligence โ it's a business model. The reports are the product's proof-of-concept: "host with us, and no amount of complaints will take you down."
ISAEV Igor: 264,349 reports across 8 IPs (33,044 per IP). An individual person named in RDAP as the responsible contact for infrastructure generating a quarter-million abuse reports. Either this person doesn't exist, doesn't care, or considers abuse reports as a metric of customer satisfaction.
TECHOFF SRV LIMITED: 165,706 reports across 8 IPs (20,713 per IP). Previously documented in TI-2026-057F as part of the Seychelles registration fraud cluster. Their abuse score (96.8%) means virtually all traffic from their IPs is malicious. Eight IPs. Twenty thousand reports each. Zero action.
NL MODAT: 147,040 reports, abuse score 100%. A perfect score. Every single report confirmed malicious. 23 IPs generating zero legitimate traffic. This is infrastructure that exists solely to attack.
The Email Clusters
Abuse Email Contacts Spanning Multiple ASNs
| Cluster | ASN Spread | Implication | |
|---|---|---|---|
| tech@cloudinnovation.org | 21 | 15 | Single entity across 15 networks |
| hm-changed@vnnic.vn | 29 | 14 | "Changed" โ stale/invalid contact |
| anti-spam@chinatelecom.cn | 22 | 9 | National ISP catch-all |
| IARPOC@Newfold.com | 21 | 5 | Hosting conglomerate generic |
| ipsupport@digi.com.my | 39 | 1 | Malaysian ISP bulk |
| kornet_ip@kt.com | 37 | 1 | Korea Telecom generic |
| fdias@frantech.ca | 29 | 1 | Individual (FranTech founder) |
tech@cloudinnovation.org โ the Seychelles entity again. One email address, 15 autonomous systems. This email is the only point of contact for attacks originating from fifteen different network providers. If this email doesn't respond (and with 21 IPs at near-100% abuse scores, it clearly doesn't), there is no escalation path.
hm-changed@vnnic.vn โ "hm-changed" is a placeholder indicating the contact was modified and not updated. 29 malicious IPs list this as their abuse contact. Reports to this address go nowhere by design โ the field was changed to indicate change itself, not to receive communication.
fdias@frantech.ca โ Francisco Dias, founder of FranTech Solutions/BuyVM. One person, 29 IPs. Unlike the corporate catch-alls, this is a real human. FranTech's abuse policy is documented: they respond, but slowly, and they give customers significant benefit of doubt. The result: persistent low-to-medium threat infrastructure that stays online weeks after first reports.
The Phone Clusters
11,324 shared abuse phone links. The largest clusters:
| Phone | Organization | Cluster | Nature |
|---|---|---|---|
| +603-57216174 | DiGi Malaysia | 39 | Mobile ISP helpline |
| +971 45546487 | RIPE NCC (UAE office?) | 36 | Registry, not operator |
| +1-877-843-7627 | Internap/SingleHop | 36 | Hosting toll-free |
| +1 510 473 2303 | Zwiebelfreunde | 35 | Tor nonprofit |
| +1-206-739-3390 | Emerald Onion | 34 | Tor exit operator |
| +33972101007 | OVH SAS | 34 | French hosting giant |
| +31 20 535 4444 | RIPE NCC | 30 (12 ASNs!) | Registry general number |
| +248-4-610-795 | Cloud Innovation | 25 (17 ASNs!) | Seychelles landline |
Consider calling +248-4-610-795. It's a Seychelles landline. The timezone is UTC+4. If you're in the US reporting abuse at 2 PM, it's 10 PM in Victoria, Seychelles. If you reach someone, they represent an entity spanning 17 autonomous systems across multiple countries. What enforcement action can a Seychelles office take against infrastructure in Hong Kong, Japan, and Germany?
The phone number exists because a phone number is required. Its purpose is regulatory compliance, not communication.
The Responsive vs. Unresponsive
Not all abuse contacts are theater. The data reveals a spectrum:
| Category | Example | Reports/IP | Behavior |
|---|---|---|---|
| Responsive | DigitalOcean (552/IP) | Low | Terminates within hours-days |
| Slow | FranTech (est. 1,000-2,000) | Medium | Responds in days-weeks |
| Overwhelmed | Korea Telecom (2,742/IP) | High | Too many reports to process |
| Decorative | NL MODAT (6,393/IP) | Very high | Contact exists, action doesn't |
| Bulletproof | PROSPERO (102,008/IP) | Extreme | Reports = proof of service quality |
DigitalOcean's 552 reports per IP reflects turnover โ IPs get reported, accounts get terminated, new accounts appear. The system works, just slowly. FranTech's higher accumulation reflects their permissive hosting stance. Korea Telecom's 2,742/IP reflects institutional inability to process volume across 57 IPs.
Then there's the gap: NL MODAT at 6,393 and PROSPERO at 102,008. This isn't failure โ it's service delivery. The abuse contact exists as a valve to absorb complaints without transmitting pressure to the customer. Each unactioned report is proof: "we protect our customers from accountability."
Read Between the Lines
The abuse reporting system is a consensus hallucination. Everyone agrees it exists. Everyone agrees reports should be sent. The sending is tracked, timestamped, and logged. But the receiving โ the part that matters โ has no accountability mechanism.
No one audits whether abuse contacts respond. No RIR policy requires minimum response rates. No allocation can be revoked for non-response to abuse (only for false contact details โ and "Private Customer" with a working phone in Seychelles technically satisfies the requirement).
The system was designed in an era when every network operator was a known entity โ universities, telecoms, government labs. The assumption was good faith. The internet grew beyond good faith decades ago, but the abuse framework remains unchanged: send a report, hope for the best.
102,008 reports to a single IP. Still online. The system is working exactly as specified. The specification simply doesn't require results.
The Thread Forward
In TI-2026-053D, we examine who issues the allocations in the first place. The registrars who assign IP space have due diligence obligations โ KYC requirements, identity verification. How do "Private Customer" and "ISAEV Igor" pass these checks? The blind eye isn't accidental.